service the global market place in striking an adequate balance between equally important conflicting interests in society.
Introduction
The recent regulatory developments on the international, regional as well as national level have resulted in an expansion of the rights of trade mark owners. At the same time, globalization and technological development has redefined the market-place. 1 The internet as a medium crosses borders, but also blurs the line between non-commercial and commercial use. 2 However, traditional trademark law only applies territorially and in a commercial setting. Likewise, extended protection for famous marks against harm to the distinctive character or reputation of the mark expands trademark protection to noncompeting commercial uses. 3 This tendency is in contrast with the traditional view, which contends that identical marks used on dissimilar goods can peacefully coexist. 4 Consequently, trade mark disputes today involve third party defendants that have not traditionally been subject to trade mark regulation. For instance, a French court held a non-degrading and non-commercial use of a famous mark infringing, since the use of the mark in newspapers without referring to it as a trademark, contributed to the degradation 3 of the distinctive character of the mark. 5 Similarly, depicting the famous wrapping paper for 'PRESIDENT' cheese on an album cover constituted unlawful exploitation of another's reputation, although the argument was made that the use was satirical. 6 Countless examples of domain-name disputes alone show favoritism of trademark owners in cyberspace. Usually defendants in trademark cases do not directly claim that a provision of trademark law with the effect of unlawfully restricting speech is invalid 11 , although it has been argued that exercise of freedom of expression should be an absolute defense to trademark infringement. 12 Until recently defendants asserting a constitutional defense have not been successful. 13 Regardless of outcome, this line of cases raise the question, whether the interests reflected and safeguards placed within trademark law itself are sufficient to protect the fundamental rights of these 'new age' defendants?
The minimum standard of international trademark protection was fixed in the TRIPS agreement, ratified by 148 countries worldwide.
14 Traditionally, international agreements on intellectual property rights only address exceptions and limitations of afforded rights when and to the extent that such exceptions are not allowed. 15 The language regarding limitations of trademark rights in the TRIPS agreement allows for member states to make limited exceptions to afforded rights (Art. 17). However, the only explicit rule is a limitation on that right; i.e. a rule prohibiting the compulsory licensing of trademark rights (Art. 21). In comparison the rights afforded to patent and copyright holders are subject to numerous exceptions. 16 Therefore, the text of the agreement concerning trademarks may create an appearance that trademark rights are less limited than other intellectual property rights. . For information on current membership see www.wto.org. 15 Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 516-517. 16 TRIPS Art. 9, 12 and 13 (copyright) and 30, 31 and 33 (patents).
article 17 "not only refers to the legitimate interests of third parties but treats them on par with those of the right holder." The panel stressed the importance of interpreting article 17 on its own terms rather than relying by analogy on previous interpretation of articles 13 and 30, addressing allowed limitations on copyright and patent rights respectively. 17 The Panel held that a regulation denying trademark owners the right to prohibit the use of legitimate geographical indications constituted a limited exception that adequately took account of the legitimate interests of the trademark owner and that of third parties. 18 The silence follows the tradition of the national trademark laws of some member states that do not include express limits on acquired rights in the statutes. 19 However, the national statutes all include at least implied limits and no country has instituted a system, where the right in a trademark is absolute. 20 
This note seeks to identify these limits expressed or implied, and ascertain whether there exists an international common core of trademark protection, i.e. a common understanding of when trademark protection is legitimately afforded and when it is not.
The outcome of any examination of trademark law from a fundamental rights perspective depends on the starting point. How are rights in a trademark and freedom of expression valued? One approach could be to view freedom of expression as a superior right entering into the realms of trademark law. 21 The freedom of expression of individuals is viewed as absolute, i.e. cannot legitimately be restricted even by legislative 17 Panel report, European Communities -Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs para. 7.649, WT/DS290/R, (March 15, 2005) enactment. In this scenario, the courts act as a post-enactment safeguard against the excesses of the legislature.
Another approach could be to view trademark law as a manifestation of constitutionally protected property, which by mere enactment trumps any concerns regarding freedom of expression.
22
This view shows great deference to the legislature. An extreme form of this approach views any trademark interest as constitutionally protected property. In a recent case before the European Court of Human Rights it was argued that a trademark application created constitutionally protectable "legitimate expectations", which must be protected against expropriation, even if registration is subsequently rejected due to opposition by a third party with prior rights to the mark. 23 The court agreed that an application could create legitimate expectations that merit protection.
24
The majority however rejected that this could be the case when the registration was subsequently denied as a result of statutory opposition or cancellation proceedings. according to the factual circumstances of each case. Since no right is unlimited, the provisions of trademark law are in this setting a manifestation of a limited right that reflects the intent of the legislature to protect a specific societal interest. 28 In the circumstances of a concrete case the actions of the defendant either more or less squarely fall within the realm of protection the legislature sought to afford. Conversely, other societal interests, including the freedom of expression of others, weigh more heavily the further away from the core of protection the actions of the defendant fall. Subsequently, this note refers to the realm in which trademark protection operates as the international common core of trademark protection.
First, this note argues in section 2 that an international common core of trademark protection that preserves the legitimacy of international trademark law can be found within existing rules. Secondly, the author argues in section 3.A that this core indicates a need to restructure the traditional approach to the interpretation of trademark rules. In section 3.B the author presents a proposal on what different interests should be given weight and how the weight given should differ depending on the circumstances of each case. The proposal is designed to ensure the legitimacy as well as the predictability of outcomes under the rules of trademark law.
Before inquiry into whether an international common core exists or not, one needs to look at the framework in which international trademark law operates. Although substantial agreement regarding trademark norms exists on the international level, trade concretization depends on the circumstances of each case. In addition to being substantive rights, the rights are objective principles or optimization requirements. Fundamental rights are also of inter-subjective character, i.e. depend on mutual recognition. Their basic function as principles is to serve as systematization and interpretation tools not necessarily in and of themselves producing a solution. See also GI-report, supra note 17, at para 7.649. 28 Mylly, supra note 21, at 201. mark laws are still inherently territorial in nature. This point is significant for two reasons. First, each country has its own system of trademark protection, concretized differently in rules of unfair competition or trademark law. 29 Consequently some countries afford stronger protection than others. However, international trademark law only sets forth minimum standards of trademark protection. This note therefore is concerned with the limits on trademark protection within the minimum standard, so to speak.
Second, concrete protection is afforded on the national level and it is also here that trademark law interacts with the rest of the legal system in the circumstances of a concrete case.
30
This fact implicates two interrelated questions; 1) how is the legitimacy of the international rules of trademark law preserved within the national legal systems and 2) do other rules of international or national law implicitly or explicitly affect the interpretation of trademark rules in practice?
2
The International Common Core of Trademark Protection
A. The Inherent Relationship between the Global Economy and Democracy
The purpose of this section is to analyze different concerns with preserving the legitimacy of international trademark rules in contemporary market reality and locate ways to define the content of international trademark law. Put differently, if we elevate the legislative power to non-democratic international fora, how do the rules put forth 29 Although a trademark owner can file an international application, he is still the holder of several national trademark rights, if the application is approved. Therefore, in the case of infringement the general rule is that a claim is brought and decided separately in each country where infringement has occurred. The claim is usually decided under the national trademark law of the country in which the action is brought. In this sense there is no such thing as an international trademark. Compare to Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 532. 30 Compare to Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 528-529 regarding copyright.
retain legitimacy.
31
This note is based on the premise that preserving legitimacy is a twostep process.
32
First, it includes the acceptance of international rules by the democratically elected national legislature.
33
Second, the rules need to be socially acceptable, i.e. indirectly legitimized by the citizenry, as evidenced by how they operate in practice within the national legal system.
34
National courts play a crucial role as interpreters of international trademark law between the first and second step of this process. This in turn raises the question of how to preserve the legitimacy of the decision making process. The latter question is discussed here. As a result of completing the twostep process, and thus retaining the legitimacy of international trademark rules with the aid of a fundamental rights framework, the remaining content of those rules is what is subsequently referred to as the international core of trademark protection.
The concept of intellectual property is premised on the property-based systems of the Western world.
35
These countries are market economies and democracies. Although all countries of the world are not premised on these same principles, the concept of intellectual property is. Therefore, for the purposes of this note it is presumed that the 31 See Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 484-485, 487 discussing how the preferred distribution of power between the legislature and the judiciary might produce one answer in the national context and an other in the international context. If the safeguards of the national legal system are not in place, the question of access and equal opportunity to influence the lawmaking process increases in importance. 32 Consequently, this approach rejects the notion that adjudicatory processes in international institutions could legitimately perform the role of shaping international trademark law. See Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, for an extensive discussion on why such an approach is not durable. Nothing in this note should be interpreted to suggest that these processes are illegitimate, when performing their prescribed functions. 33 The second stage is a necessary check on the first, since the relationship between national, regional and international developments is increasingly complex, and national laws risk becoming mere strategic tools to influence the direction of international development. 
50
Petersmann further argues that compliance results not from the perceived legitimacy of international rules, but from government's cost/benefit analysis on a larger 47 Schneiderman, supra note 35, at 238. 48 
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International, supra note 10, at 25. 49 Petersmann, supra note 43, at 1 and 20. Efficiency therefore depends on the proper assignment of different rights. 50 Petersmann, supra note 43, at 1.
scale as well as the practice of internalization of international rules into the domestic policy-making process and laws. Values and policies of international economic law based on abstract notions of "welfare" and "economic efficiency", must be legitimized through individual consent, equal rights and democratic procedures. Therefore, he contends that 'justice' is and should be the only objective of national as well as international law.
51
The appropriate basis for national as well as international 'justice' is found through respect for and protection of the inalienable core of fundamental rights.
52
Docteur en Droit Christophe Geiger also argues that fundamental rights act as a correcting restraint on governments. 53 The underlying premise of the argument is that national governments cannot assign their constitutional obligations by the creation of international bodies like the World Trade Organization (WTO).
54
The obligation instead is divided in two parts; the governments are obligated to protect individual rights on both the national and the international level.
55
Ph. D. Felix S. Cohen similarly argues that we
should not create such a complex system of abstract norms so as to loose sight of the framework in which it operates.
56
A rule is therefore not legitimate merely because governments or their courts enforce it, rather it should be acknowledged that they engage in distributing economic wealth and power. Although Judge Richard Posner also uses the actual consequences of a decision as the starting point for any decision-making process, he rejects the notion that decisionmakers are constrained by legal, moral or political theories. Instead he argues the decision-maker in a democracy is influenced by the institutional and material constraints of the legal framework. In order to avoid erosion of his own authority the decision-maker acknowledges his own limits in rethinking settled issues.
59
Depending on the circumstances a pragmatic approach might call for balancing of competing interests or abstaining from balancing all together.
60
However, Posner's approach is case-specific and practical and concerns itself mostly with the judicial role within a democracy.
61
Posner's criterion for whether a decisionmaker should adhere to past decisions is the practical consequences for doing so now and in the future.
62
Systemic consequences, other than maintaining predictability, generality and impartiality are irrelevant, since the decision-maker should reach a decision that produces the best consequences for the parties. . Nevertheless, he acknowledges flexibility in his theory based on 1) the level of regulation; 2) the varying value of things; and 3) the position of the defendant in contemporary political reality. Therefore, the more local the rule the greater deference should be given to the regulator, weighing the experimental value of flexible decision-making against the harm of a single wrongful decision. 67 Secondly, although some things are considered more valuable than others in the abstract, it does not follow that one thing is more valuable and therefore should be given preference in all circumstances.
68
Finally, it does make a difference, as a matter of practical consequences for the parties, whether a defendant holds a majority or a minority view.
69
How then do the above-mentioned arguments apply in the context of international trademark law? First, instead of purely relying on the embodied rules and principles of international trademark agreements they should be read in a broader context, i.e. in the context of existing international law and the national laws from which they were derived.
Second, the nature and purpose of international rules should be borne in mind and the process of defining the content of the law through interpretation should reflect the limited nature of all statutory rights. Third, any contemplated decision should be weighed against its concrete consequences for the parties, especially in relation to the fundamental rights of the defendant. Fourth, adequate consideration should be given to whether or not the defendant's interests were represented when the rule was set forth.
70 66 Directly and purely instrumental = Where decision-making should exercise restraint in relation to other branches of government, as opposed to engage in improving the political character, or always act on the highest level of moral and intellectual capacity of the citizenry. 67 Posner, supra note 64, at 371. 68 Posner, supra note 64, at 374. 69 Posner, supra note 64, at 365 and 377. 70 See also Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 576-578.
In conclusion, the global economy, as well as protection of fundamental rights, requires constant regulation and re-distribution of rights to prevent market failure. This never-ending adjustment task cannot be tied to any one value in a constitution, but to the constitutional framework of democracy and a functioning market economy. 71
C. A Practical Review of the Inherent Limitations on the Statutory Rights of the Trademark Owner

C.1 Limitations within Trademark Law
Mainly common law countries explicitly regulate both cause of action and defenses. Civil law countries however rarely include express limitations in their trademark statutes. This does not however mean that the afforded rights are intended to be unlimited.
72
For historical reasons the civil law tradition is reflected in international intellectual property regulation.
73
The strong negotiation power of the United States in recent years, which has sought to mirror the substantive level of protection to that of its national laws, has greatly influenced international intellectual property regulation. In the United States, however, the interests of the competition as well as the consumers are protected as entrenched constitutional rights. Thus, in a sense they remain constant and equally present, regardless of expansion of protection for owners of intellectual property. In contrast, civil law countries need to actively consider the issue of striking a balance and take appropriate action. When as in trademark law, however, the statute is based on implied limitations, consideration has largely been neglected. Furthermore, the weight and scope of these exceptions in relation to dilution protection is unclear.
C.2 Limitations outside Trademark Law-A Comparative Approach
Laying the Foundation for an Issue-Based Comparison
Unfair 79 75 The infringing user is a business, who seeks to use the mark to promote the sale of its products. 76 The infringer uses the trademark affixed to or in connection with a product. 77 The infringer uses the mark to gain financially. Compare to French cases below, where the trademark owner contends that the use is infringing because the defendant is a commercial enterprise. See also Travis, supra note 7, at 33-43. 78 Geiger, supra note 19, at 273-274. The mere existence of a legal concept that could be interpreted as a safeguard is meaningless, if it in practice is interpreted to the detriment of the purported goal. See Cohen, supra note 60, at 815-817 and 838. 79 The decisions all find in favor of the defendants on account of their freedom of expression. There exists a large number of cases all over the world, which find similar uses infringing. These cases do not balance fundamental rights, but find that the infringing use does not enjoy protection. Therefore, they are of no avail for the present purposes. The principle of proportionality further commands that the interfering act is proportional to the aim sought. The nature and severity of the penalties imposed are relevant in this assessment.
84
Lastly, a norm cannot be regarded as "law" unless it is sufficiently precisely formulated, so that a citizen can reasonably foresee the This note does not attempt to discuss whether or not the exclusive right in a trademark enjoys constitutional protection as property.
92
Rather, the focus is on drawing the line between when protection is warranted to the detriment of the rights of others, and when it is not. Inquiry into where the protection originally stems from does not further this goal, since any interest of the legislature to afford protection is already manifested in the trademark statute. Thus giving the intent of the legislature additional weight implies intent to raise this right above others, which is inconsistent with the principle of equality.
Taking the statute as a starting point, confines the reach of the limitation of the rights of others within its constitutional bounds, and consequentially within the legislative power of the legislature. After all, a fundamental right can only be subject to the restrictions necessary for the protection of the rights of others. (July 9, 2004 ). An appeal is alterations of the plaintiffs' marks on its website, while the last case concerned use of the plaintiff's mark in domain names in "I boycott TM"-format. 95 The court noted that it was obliged not only to evaluate the seriousness of the alleged acts, but also to determine whether the requested legal measures against the acts in the present circumstances were appropriate.
Therefore, the court did not proceed to inquire whether the acts were infringing, but to what extent they were permitted. The court noted that although the freedom of expression is not absolute, the speaker is entitled to choose whatever form to denounce someone's activities it feels appropriate to the objective pursued. After emphasizing that this right can only be restrained to the extent necessary for the protection of the rights of others, the court went on to evaluate the actions of the defendant.
The Greenpeace-court noted that the context of the use 1) clearly showed the intention to denounce plaintiff's activities; 2) without misleading the public about the identity of the author of the message; and 3) was clearly not intended to promote the goods or services of the defendant; nor 4) was the use otherwise "normal in ordinary business life" 96 . Furthermore, the court noted that the acts complained of could be the object of compensation after the proceedings, and therefore interlocutory measures were not required. The marketing took place on the internet. 101 The court found that the lower court incorrectly approached the question; inquiring first whether the acts amounted to infringement, and only after finding infringement asking whether the defendant's constitutional right of freedom of expression afforded justification for it. 102 The court held that a finding of infringement hinges on whether the expression at issue is constitutionally protected or not. If the expression is constitutionally protected, what is allegedly unfair or detrimental must be weighed against the competing claim of freedom of expression.
103
The trademark statute should be given a meaning, which is least destructive of other entrenched rights. 104 The court noted that merely unpopular speech could not have been targeted by the trademark legislation, since this would amount to censorship of certain speech. Thus the speech itself and the common understanding of it do not constitute proof of harm for the purposes of dilution protection. The legislator must instead have intended to protect the selling power of the mark against economic detriment. 
United States -Expressing Opposing Views to that of Reverend Falwell
A shift in court practice in the United States is in the air as well. 107 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently reversed the judgment of the lower court that had found a gripe-site infringing. 108 The defendant had created a website (www.fallwell.com) to respond to and criticize the views of a nationally known TVMinister, Reverend Falwell. 109 Although other courts have dismissed similar claims on similar grounds 110 this case is significant, since a shift in emphasis in favor of free speech concerns is notable in the way the court construed its own precedent. The court also explicitly rejected the digital branch of "initial interest confusion"-theory that had developed in some courts, as contrary to what the Ninth Circuit initially had intended.
111
The court held that an allegedly infringing use should always be examined in the context in which it is seen by the ordinary consumer. 112 Similarly, a court should not consider how closely a fragment of a given use duplicates the trademark, but must instead consider whether the use in its entirety creates a likelihood of confusion. 113 South African court, the U.S. court emphasized that the mere fact that speech is critical of a corporation and its business practices is not sufficient to enjoin the speech.
114
Comparative Conclusions
The South African Constitutional Court was the only court that actually engaged in comparative analysis on constitutional as well as trademark issues. All of the courts approached the issue from a balancing perspective, although the U.S. court was assessing the case in relation to the ordinary test of infringement, and not like the French and South African court finding the fact that the use constituted constitutionally protected expression exceptional. The latter courts expressly indicated that a stricter test applied, when protected expression was being restricted. 115 It is hard to say, if the US court gave greater weight than they ordinarily would have to the constitutional nature of the use, or if it was the resulting effect (or lack there of) of the defendant's use that tilted each of the factors in the infringement-test in the defendant's favor.
Not surprisingly the burden in the US court seemed to be on the defendant to prove that its acts constituted constitutionally protected speech. The French and South African courts did not, however, directly address the issue. Rather they seemed to regard the question as one of law, which was to be determined by the court's assessment of the facts of the case, not necessarily as presented to it by the parties.
116
Both approaches seem to equally leave adequate room for addressing constitutional issues in trademark cases.
The US approach, however, seems somewhat more vulnerable to undue restriction of a fundamental right, since the defendant's failure to argue its case properly or persuasively might lead to the accordance of constitutionally undue benefit to the plaintiff. The systemic consequences of a series of decisions of this nature are felt today worldwide, when unchecked expansive interpretation of trademark rights has lead to encroachment on all others. Lastly, the courts seemed to agree that trademark protection is not intended to protect the dignity of the business, but the commercial value of the trademark in relation to their products.
D National Courts as Necessary International Laboratories
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, human rights have been reaffirmed in more than a 100 treaties by most nations worldwide. member states, mainly due to its efficient enforcement provisions. 120 As mentioned above, it should be noted though that Western democratic nations, generally afford greater trademark protection than mandated by the minimum standards of international trademark law.
How then does the grant of a privilege in the form of an intellectual property right affect the state's duty or ability to promote recognized human rights? The UN High Commissioner of Human Rights argues that whatever the balance struck between public and private interests in intellectual property, the balance should not work to the detriment of any recognized human right. 121 Furthermore, the report recognizes two steps in determining whether the TRIPS-agreement promotes human rights. First, the agreement itself should be assessed for compatibility with a human rights approach, and secondly the implementation of the agreement must be assessed to determine the effects of the agreement on human rights in practice.
122
While the report focuses on the former, this note focuses on the more indirect latter step.
Some general guidance for interpretation can be found in the objectives of the TRIPS agreement, which recognize a need to balance competing interests in society and emphasize that nothing in the agreement is intended to allow for rights afforded, to themselves become illegitimate barriers to trade. Since a treaty is to be interpreted narrowly and according to the ordinary meaning of its text, there is no room for e contrario-conclusions in international law. The absence of expressed limits merely means that the issue was not addressed. 129 This in turn leads the interpreter to look to practices within member states.
Professor Graeme Dinwoodie argues that development of international intellectual property rules on the national level-more specifically through private litigation-is preferred to the development taking place in international fora.
130
National decision-making is fast, flexible, efficient and thus more apt to keep up with technological advancement and social change. Furthermore, national courts are less likely 124 Geiger, supra note 19, at 271 and Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 516-517. 125 In section 1. 126 The Vienna Convention, supra note 45. Although all members of the UN or WTO are not signatories to the Vienna Convention its provisions nonetheless applies to those members, which are signatories of the Convention (Art. 3c). The Vienna Convention also codifies some rules of customary international law on interpretation of treaties that are binding on all nations and its rules are frequently applied by e.g. WTO panels in dispute settlement proceedings. Some Western democracies are signatories to the Convention and are therefore bound by all of its provisions in interpreting the TRIPS agreement. 127 The Vienna Convention, supra note 45, Article 31. 128 Petersmann, supra note 43, at 14. to be trapped in a narrow trade-related frame of mind, since they naturally apply trade regulation as part of a complete legal system. Nor are cases in private litigation as likely to be affected by political interests.
131
While the results of national courts are not formally binding, they function as international laboratories producing results that gain international legitimacy through the persuasiveness of the rule that is set forth. Each decision is tested by the force of its own argument in justifying the chosen approach. 132 It is imperative that this test occurs in the context of local analysis by another court. 133 Critical scrutiny of foreign decisions, including testing, analyzing, distinguishing, rejecting and borrowing, is an essential part of the development of a legitimate body of international law. 134 Thus, rather than formally obligating the developing body of law is premised on the law of reason. 135 The level of persuasiveness depends on both the issue to be decided and the degree of conflict with international law. On the other hand, the lack of consensus on one issue of trademark protection does not preclude influence of international law on another relating issue.
136
National courts engage in an international dialogue that neither undermines local authority nor disconnects legal analysis from its local origin, on the contrary, the dialogue is essential to the authority of the rule itself. . 134 Harding, supra note 139, at 424-425. 135 Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 550-552 and 570. 136 
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International, supra note 10, at 33. 137 Harding, supra note 139, at 464, 439 and 461 "The point is to broaden the scope of analysis on the use of foreign law, to understand the larger context of decision-making in which use of foreign law is just a piece, and through such larger context to determine whether connected concerns about legitimacy, certainty, coherence and utility are valid." policy is the origin of the rules of national trademark law today. Awareness of the similarities and differences in the national systems is therefore essential to any endeavor seeking an international core of trademark protection.
As mentioned above, although formally recognized by all Western democracies, the concrete protection of fundamental rights within national legal systems varies greatly.
Some countries afford protection through various forms of judicial review; others afford protection passively relying on government bodies to secure the distribution of rights equally among its citizens. Still others allow for judicial review, but have no case law in practice. 138 Does this mean that states without judicial review, where the scope of each right therefore is less refined, are less obligated to secure the 'core' human rights of its citizens?
This note argues that the opposite should be presumed; absent an equally fundamental public interest against protecting fundamental rights in a specific instance citizens of the world are equally protected under international law. This approach allows for constitutionalism to serve the purpose of framing the rules and institutions associated with economic globalization without the requirement of specific unitary action of national governments.
139
Instead of being constrained by the text of a statute or the absence of an adequate rule, the judge is constrained by the international legal framework in seeking to strike an appropriate balance in accordance with the rules set forth by it.
140
There is no reason why the law should be helpless, when society or conduct 138 For a concise overview of judicial review in some Western democracies see Favoreau, Louis, Constitutional Review in Europe in Constitutionalism and Rights 38-62 (Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); and Jackson Vicki C., Tuschnet, Mark, Comparative Constitutional Law 490-491, 1999. 139 Schneiderman, supra note 35, at 240 and 243. 140 Posner, supra note 64, at 363. This note views the legal framework somewhat differently than Posner. First, Posner refers solely to the US system and the judge's role in it. The judicial role worldwide differs changes in an unpredictable way.
141
After all, fundamental rights are not unlimited in application. Rather, on the international level fundamental rights can be viewed as social obligations, as duties on national lawmakers to those they represent.
142
The product of the legislature-in this case a trademark act or provision-is thus tested against standards of necessity and consistency in view of alternative policies. 143 Thus, citizen-equality is the goal. The principle of rationality mandates that the lawmaker choose a means that interferes with individual rights no more than necessary in order to pursue a social good.
The principle of proportionality, on the other hand, mandates the lawmaker to achieve an end that is consistent with how similar interests have been treated in the past.
144
Access to justice is thus guaranteed to minorities, who cannot exert influence in the political process on the international level.
However, when balancing fundamental rights against each other, rights can be viewed as optimization requirements. The standards thus take on the form of negative remarkably from its US counterpart. Rather than attempting to define the judicial role in a system, this note merely argues that the judge is bound by the rule of law, when applying international rules in a new, previously undefined setting. Secondly, Posner's theory is premised on judicial deference to the other branches of a democratic government. The international organs are, however, not democratic. Furthermore, the 'legislative' branch, consisting of representatives of all nations that must reach consensus to take legislative action, is far too inefficient to serve as the corrective organ Posner envisions, where the democratic process works at its best. Third, Posner's theory presupposes the existence of a complex, but nonetheless unitary legal framework. This does not exist on the international level, if the binding general principles of international (and national) law are not allowed to be given concrete effect in national courts. Posner too recognizes the exceptional nature of interest analysis when weighing constitutional rights; since the constitution is so hard to amend, and the consequences of a bad decision, therefore is far graver. However, the primary focus should still be on the case-specific rather than systemic consequences, and the cost/benefit analysis should be based on long run as opposed to short run social costs and benefits. It should be noted that cost/benefit analysis is only used as a tool to the extent that it helps the judge identify and weigh the consequences of alternative decisions. See and compare to Petersmann, supra note 43, at 2-4. 141 Posner, supra note 64, at 375. 142 Beatty, supra note 38, at 147 arguing that the focus should not be on a sphere of protection for individual rights. 143 Beatty, supra note 38, at 147-148. 144 Beatty, supra note 38, at 149. criterions, which do not lead to answers, but rather to the exclusion of incorrect ones.
145
Some solutions present themselves naturally as a choice in favor of the Pareto-optimal. 146 Some present a true conflict that require the assessment of 1) the degree of nonsatisfaction of a right; 2) the degree of importance of the rights in question; and 3) their relationship to each other.
Professor Robert Alexy summarizes his point in two laws of balancing. First, the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other. Second, the more heavily an interference with a fundamental right weighs, the greater must be the certainty of its underlying premises.
147
These laws reflect the two-fold nature of fundamental rights; they serve both as a qualitative foundation and a framework for decision-making. 152 See Travis, supra note 7, at 8-31 and AIPPI Q 188: France, supra note 5, at 128. 153 See Travis, supra note 7, at 32-72 for an overview of the case law in the US regarding trademarks vs. free-speech interests in cyberspace. He lists four avenues of interpretive extension of trademark protection that courts have utilized in order to find infringement. First, the requirement of a finding of commercial activity has been eroded by e.g. finding that an offer to sell a domain-name to a trademark owner constitutes commercial use. Second, a loosening of the standard of consumer confusion has allowed relief against momentary confusion without impact on any purchasing decision. Third, the flexible expansion of the theory of initial interest confusion to non-competing uses has allowed trademark owners to prohibit any attempt to gain the attention of consumers with the aid of trademarks in cyberspace. Lastly, the dilution provision has been interpreted to prohibit all creation of negative associations with a trademark. 
156
Unfair competition law to some extent has tools to deal with trademark misuse; however, these avenues are hardly used in practice due to the climate of strong protection of intellectual property rights. 157 Professor William Landes & Judge Posner however reject the notion that trademark protection since it fosters product differentiation creates deadweight costs on society, whether of monopoly or excessive competition. 158 clarifies the economist's perspective on the inherent economic nature of trademark rights.
"Trademarks, which protect the exclusive right to commercial identity, are much more difficult to characterize as a monopoly, since the ability of a firm to identify itself would seem to be an essential prerequisite for competition, not a limit on competition…[However, w]hether a particular right, or combination of rights, confers an economic monopoly is an empirical question." 159 In line with this distinction, this note argues that the increasing number of instances of trademark misuse disguised under the veil of protection of current legislation warrants review of whether the benefits of the system still outweigh the costs. 160 Landes & Posner further argue that a common mistake in economic analysis of intellectual property rights is to reduce the discussion to a tradeoff between incentive and access, and ignore the lessons learned in striking an appropriate balance between competing interests regarding physical property. This trend is particularly damaging to the analysis of trademark rights, because unlike copyrighted works and patented products, a trademark is not a public good. 161 The social value lies in its ability to designate origin. Thus, the social cost of protection as well as infringement varies in relation to the type of mark and the social benefit it produces. 162 For example, when the trademark owner creates an illusion of infringement where protection is not afforded, the social costs of infringement are not equal to instances of traditional trademark infringement. Quite the contrary, in this situation the social cost of protection rises. It is therefore, not necessary to assume that trademarks can never create deadweight costs on society by the mere fact that protection is afforded.
We then turn to the trademark laws themselves to search for limits on trademark owner's rights. Unlike property-ownership that is derived from possession of a physical object, the exclusive right in a trademark is an abstract legislative creation. In an attempt to regulate the free market and protect consumers, trademark legislation affords a negative right, the right to exclude others. Trademark rights are thus a legislative exception to the general rule of freedom of competition.
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All trademark statutes contain implied limits, e.g. by restricting the scope of protection to the economic sector; to use in commerce; and on competing goods.
164
The recent piecemeal expansion of trademark protection has however somewhat blurred the traditional function of trademark law.
Court practice also suggests an absence of limits, since all traditional doctrines of limitation have gradually been interpreted to allow for protection against new forms of use.
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Thus, the contemporary challenge for the trademark system is to restore its limits and enforce their application, so as not to cause market failure.
166
This leads us back to allowing fundamental rights to serve as a qualitative foundation, when deciding issues that are of great importance to society.
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This tool is particularly useful, since it is no longer possible or desirable to give categorical answers, 163 Mogens Koktvedgaard, Laerebog i konkurrenceret 22, (3rd edition, 1997). 164 Geiger, supra note 19, at 270. 165 Geiger, supra note 19, at 272-273. Travis, supra note 7, at 8-31. 166 Geiger, supra note 19, at 278-280. 167 Alexy, supra note 27, at 394. The systemic consequences of decision-making have long been ignored within trademark law, which has become increasingly elitist and separated from the rest of the legal system. Compare to Cohen, supra note 60, at 811 and 814: "Even in the most modern realms of legal development one finds the thought of courts and legal scholars trapezing around in cycles and epicycles without coming to rest on the floor of verifiable fact"…" As strange as impossible abstract reasoning is to laymen, lawyers will accept this reasoning as relevant, material and competent."
but the line has to be drawn on a case-by-case basis. This raises the question of predictability.
3.B From Good vs. Bad to Right vs. Right
In sum, the legislative compromise struck between different interest groups on the market at the international level arguably creates a paradox. It has allowed the field of intellectual property law to drift away from the safeguards of the national legal system, although no equivalent safeguards are in place at the international level, since deference is traditionally shown to national legislatures on this issue. International norms and lawmaking, however, depend on the context of the national legal rules to work appropriately.
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It is quite clear that no one intended to elevate international intellectual property law as the supreme law of the world.
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International intellectual property law allows for protection of one actor in the market place to secure the interests of another interest group, consumers. Securing the interests of other actors on the market in the interest of a functioning market is left to national legislators. It is also important to acknowledge the purpose and goal of international rules, which mainly aim at 1) preventing piracy; 2) allowing for adequate enforcement against piracy and free-riding; and 3) securing a minimum standard of protection of intellectual property worldwide.
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In contrast, the aim of national regulation is broader; to strike an adequate balance between competing interest groups on the market, i.e. trademark owners, consumers and competitors. 168 Petersmann, supra note 43, at 2 and Schneiderman, supra note 35, at 240. 169 Dinwoodie 2000, supra note 1, at 505. 170 TRIPS, supra note 14.
The avalanche of international rules focusing on the afore-mentioned two interests, have resulted in an uneven emphasis in the national rules of market regulation.
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The goal of this note is to strengthen the third inherent pillar of international market regulation, which secures the societal interest in a functioning market by encouraging competition and fair trade. The issue is no longer the limitation of one right, but the balancing of competing rights.
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When adding a new dimension to trademark interpretation you cannot simply try to fit the new data into the old two-dimensional formula. You need to create a new multidimensional formula, in which you insert the new and old data, in order to calculate how several factors affect and relate to each other. Such a systemizing tool is needed to secure the realization of -no more and no less than -the international core of trademark protection in the national application of trademark law.
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Since the societal interest behind trademark protection varies according to the use of the mark, it would be helpful to find a way to categorize the defendants into groups.
There are three Since categorical approaches tend to produce unsatisfactory results judges need to approach these cases from a broader perspective placing trademark law in its proper legal framework. In so doing, it is necessary to take into account the purposes of and societal interests behind international and national trademark norms. A forward-looking approach in tune with a fundamental rights framework will guide the judge in balancing trademark protection against the fundamental rights of others.
Since national trademark rules share a common source national courts should look to prior decisions on the issue by other courts and engage in an international dialogue.
Where independent national decision-making in several nations, despite national differences, reflect similar argumentation towards the same goal the emerging network of decisions would set forth rules of international trademark law. This non-binding 175 
Compare to Laugh it Off Promotions CC vs. South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a
Sabmark International, supra note 10, at 60. See also Cohen, supra note 60, at 817 on some re-evaluating questions inspired by social and economic considerations that should be asked when the interests clash.
